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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TWO TYPES
OF AUTONOMY
Steven H. Shiffrin*
For several decades, I have maintained that social reality is
too complex to hope or expect that First Amendment theory
1
could be reduced to a single value or a small set of values.
Nonetheless, extraordinarily fruitful scholarship can be
produced by those who try. Such scholarship can show just how
far we can get by resort to monistic approaches (as well as their
limits). C. Edwin Baker and Seana Valentine Shiffrin offer two
approaches to autonomy. Baker’s approach rests on a speaker
liberty theory that he put forward over a period of decades. It is,
for my money, the best that has been put forward in the field,
eclipsing those of Rawls and Dworkin, for example. It represents
in my view the most thoughtful defense of the ACLU position
2
on freedom of speech.
Shiffrin puts forward a substantial and original contribution
to the literature. She—wisely in my view—does not seek to offer
a comprehensive theory. But she maintains that if we focus on
humans as thinkers instead of as speakers or audience members,
* Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE ch. 1 (1990); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1212 (1983); Steven H. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment
Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978). Similarly, in Steven Shiffrin, Dissent,
Political Participation, and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559 (2011), I
argue that political participation will not serve as an organizing principle for First
Amendment doctrine or as a primary normative basis for First Amendment theory.
I have argued that if the First Amendment is to have a center it should be protecting
and encouraging the practice of dissent. In addition to the Democracy and Romance
book supra, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA (1999). Although I think protecting and encouraging the practice of dissent is
vital (primarily because of its role in combating unjust power relations), I do not think
dissent is valuable per se (its value depends on the First Amendment values it implicates
in particular contexts and the harm the government seeks to mitigate caused by dissent).
Indeed, I think that the presence of dissent is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient basis
for protection.
2. I expand on this in a memorial essay on Ed’s life and work. Steven Shiffrin, Ed
Baker: Friend and First Amendment Scholar, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 963 (2010).
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we can provide surprising insights across a range of First
Amendment issues. One might have thought that the First
Amendment literature would have explored in detail the
implications of freedom of thought, but it has not, and Shiffrin
systematically forges a new path.
Baker argues that the legitimacy of government demands
respect for formal autonomy. He apparently maintains that
instrumental reasons need play no role in speech clause analysis
3
(though they do in press clause analysis). The crucial question
for Baker is whether a speaker has coerced or manipulated
another. If so, the speech is not protected. If not, the speech is
4
protected. Thus, he says that obscenity is an easy case for his
system. Obscenity does not coerce or manipulate, and, therefore,
5
it is protected. Note that Baker’s system dictates this conclusion
wholly apart from the consequences of obscene speech. The
same would be true of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, fighting words, the revealing of intimate facts about a
person’s private life, negligent defamation of private persons (at
least in the non-media context), and racist speech including the
advocacy of genocide (so long as it did not amount to an
attempt). It may be that there are good grounds to protect all the
speech in these categories (I doubt it), but resolving these
problems via moral geometry without attention to the
consequences does not seem right to me. Blanket protection for
formal autonomy seems insufficiently respectful of the dignity of
human beings as witnessed by its protection of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fighting words, the revealing of
private facts about a person’s private life, and some negligent
(indeed, even grossly negligent) defamation of character. In

3. Although his liberty theory made instrumental arguments unnecessary to
ground freedom of speech, he also thought that instrumental arguments supported his
conclusions as well.
4. I leave to the side Baker’s distinction between substantively valued and
instrumentally valued speech because it is not important for my criticisms.
5. Actually, since obscenity is ordinarily accomplished by means of what Baker
would classify as the press, he has imported some of his free speech conclusions into the
press clause. In the balance of my analysis, I will assume he does the same in other areas
including the revealing of private facts about a person’s private life and defamation. In
prior work, for example, he says that defamation law should arrive at the same answers
whether the defendant is a private individual or the press. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 242 (1989). Particularly because attention to
consequences is required in the press context under his analysis, I do not think he was
bound to arrive at the same results in speech and press cases. The only area, however,
where I know that he arrived at somewhat different results between speech and press was
in the copyright arena.
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6

addition, suppose that pornography and racist speech create
unjust conditions for women and people of color. In the absence
7
of good consequentialist arguments against such prohibitions, it
is a little odd to be told that injustice must be maintained in
order to protect the legitimacy of the government. In the case of
racist speech and pornography, the effect of Baker’s system is
automatically to privilege negative liberty over the positive
liberty that might be created by governmental egalitarian
measures. To put it another way, using Baker’s terminology, I
believe that it is sometimes appropriate to privilege substantive
autonomy over formal autonomy even when the exercise of
formal autonomy has not interfered with the equal formal
autonomy of another. Doing so, in my view, can make the
8
government more legitimate.
The exercise of the formal autonomy of speech can fit into
the problematic categories of speech mentioned above or it can
produce uncontroversially protected political, religious, artistic,
scientific, or private communications. As I understand him,
Baker maintains that interfering with racist speech is no better
or worse than interfering with religious or political speech (at
least from a formal perspective—obviously Baker was no fan of
racist speech). Nonetheless, there are grounds to be suspicious of
a theory that equates these categories of speech without need of
further investigation. From Baker’s perspective, to interfere with
formal autonomy (when the person has not interfered with the
autonomy of another) is to disrespect the speaker. To deny such
autonomy is to give up on any legitimate basis for justifying the
use of force against an individual.
I deny that interference with formal autonomy in the
circumstances I mentioned earlier disrespects the speaker. The
government can have great respect for the speaker as a citizen,
but it can disrespect the choices made by the speaker precisely
because the speech causes harm that outweighs the value of the
6. Following MacKinnon, I would distinguish pornography from obscenity, but the
distinction is not important in this context.
7. In the past, I have argued that there are good consequentialist arguments
against prohibiting racist speech in the United States, but not against prohibiting some
forms of pornography. I doubt I was right about racist speech and suspect that the case
for pornography regulations was not as strong as I thought. I continue, however, to think
the case for the latter is strong enough to justify regulation.
8. For reasons I have developed elsewhere, I actually do not think it is possible to
have a government in a large-scale society that is legitimated for all citizens. It is always
possible, however, to move toward a better and more legitimate government. See
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 91–
93.
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9

speech. There is another way to put this: I am in Mill’s family;
Baker is in Kant’s family by way of Habermas. Baker
complained that the harm principle is fuzzy, undefined, and
capable of manipulation. It is. Indeed, Baker argued that the
harm principle inherently requires difficult substantive
judgments about the character of harm, the extent of harm
required for abridgment, the particular types of autonomy that
need to be respected and those that do not, and ultimately
assessments of what it takes for human beings to flourish. Baker
argued that his commitment to formal autonomy leaves many
fewer grey areas and offers a defining path in a difficult area. It
does. I do not think his path leads us off a cliff, but I do think it
leads to many unfortunate results and could potentially lead to
injustice.
Finally, I deny that interference with formal autonomy in
the circumstances I have outlined makes a government
illegitimate. If the facts warranted intervention in the context of
racist speech, I would rather explain to the racist why his moral
theory is defective and why the state need not respect it than try
to explain to people of color that they must live in unjust
conditions. Similarly, if a person intentionally inflicts emotional
distress upon another, I would rather explain to the tortfeasor
why her conduct was reprehensible than explain to the victim
that we are obligated not to violate the formal autonomy of the
10
tortfeasor.
I think the position I have taken applies to all those who try
to develop a comprehensive theory of free speech autonomy
within a Kantian or neo-Kantian framework. Kant thought that
“freedom” (a term of art) could not be restricted unless it
interfered with the freedom of another; with limited exceptions,
Dworkin argued that the right of freedom of speech could be
interfered with only if it interfered with another’s right; Rawls
argued that the basic liberty of freedom of speech could be
abridged only if it interfered with another basic liberty; and
Baker argues that the autonomy of freedom of speech can be
9. Applying a harm test requires a contestable conception of human anthropology
or of what it means for human beings to flourish. Baker was not opposed for government
to act on such conceptions, but he did not think such conceptions should play a role in
restricting liberty.
10. I do not think it is possible to have a legitimate government in any large-scale
“democracy” (let alone in our corpocracy) because of the inevitable corruption present
in large-scale bureaucracies and hierarchies, but governments can improve their claims to
legitimacy (they can be less injust), so I am not bothered by the large role that legitimacy
played in grounding Baker’s system.
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interfered with only if it coerces (or manipulates) and thus
interferes with the autonomy of another. Although the formal
structure of the argument is the same, their results differ. Kant
said that freedom included reputation (conceived as a property
right) and was in favor of imposing liability for defaming the
dead. Rawls did not list reputation in his scheme of basic
liberties. Out of thin air, Dworkin discovered a “right” not to be
negligently defamed. To the extent Baker supports an action for
defamation, it arises from manipulative speech. But the
defamed’s autonomy is not interfered with by that speech. The
defamed is a third party. To my mind stretching the system to
arrive at sensible results is appropriate. But I think some
11
stretching is necessary even to deal with defamatory lies.
I would conclude this aspect of the analysis to note that
Baker rarely stretches. He applies his system with integrity. He
shows that the autonomy justification will not apply to business
corporations or to media corporations. He rightly argues that
those who argue from speaker autonomy must employ different
principles to have a theory of the press. As I mentioned earlier, I
think he does the best job of showing where formal speaker
autonomy leads, but I believe it inherently leads us away from
satisfactory results in too many contexts to serve as a
comprehensive theory of freedom of speech. Imperfect as it is, I
believe that balancing can lead us to more satisfactory results.
Although I do not think that “the individual agent’s interest
in the protection of the free development and operation of her
12
mind” is central to the First Amendment, I do think that Seana
Shiffrin is right to argue that such an interest is of special
importance and leads us to significant insights. I think that her
exploration of the interests that every individual, rational,
human agent qua thinker possesses is genuinely illuminating;
that her claim of the special importance of speech to human
beings as thinkers is original and unassailable, and I agree with
her conclusion (well tied to freedom of thought) that dissent,
religious speech, fiction, art, music, diaries, personal
11. Baker’s theory would seem to authorize non-protection for all lies. But I doubt
he would have allowed juries, judge, or administrative agencies to impose sanctions for
any and all utterances that they deemed to be lies. The alternative would be to authorize
the imposition of sanctions only if there is some further harm. But this opens Baker to
the kind of subjectivity he has sought to avoid and for which he has criticized Mill. In
fairness, however, this problem is limited to a narrow category of already problematic
speech.
12. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech¸ 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 298 (2011).
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conversations and letters deserve strong protection under the
First Amendment. I also think that her perspective yields
important light on the much discussed subject of compelled
13
speech in West Virginia v. Barnette and on the muddled
doctrine of freedom of association.
I would like to sketch, however, a few areas where I think
or know that we differ or wonder if we do. Although I share the
view that many types of speech must be protected to safeguard
the role of thinkers, and I understand the conclusion that from
thinkers’ perspectives, no hierarchy among these forms of
speech appears to be appropriate, I believe, as I think she does,
that the thinker’s perspective should not be the exclusive
perspective. If that perspective is not exclusive, then there is
room to argue for various hierarchies. I have argued, for
example, that the role of speech in combating injustice in public
and private contexts is especially important. From this
perspective, it is particularly important to protect dissent. Of
course, she could agree with this and think no hierarchy is
necessary, but that conclusion would flow from something more
than a thinker’s perspective.
Second, I think that the thinker’s perspective could
potentially protect too much speech. I have in mind commercial
speech or the speech of non-press business corporations. For
Baker the issue was relatively easy. Commercial and corporate
14
speech are dictated by the market and, therefore is not an
exercise of speaker liberty. For Baker, listeners have no
“affirmative constitutional right to override a restriction” on
commercial or corporate speech. Shiffrin argues that commercial
and corporate speech should receive lesser protection, but the
thinker’s perspective may not provide a sturdy enough
explanation for this conclusion. I can see how a thinker’s
perspective can provide an argument with respect to corporate
political speech. To the extent corporate political speech is
13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
14. Shiffrin rightly argues that Baker’s claim that commercial and corporate speech
are dictated by the market is overbroad in cases of market failure or in cases where
organic farmers, for example, revolt against the reigning commercial values in the
market. The problem of market failure was acute for Baker’s theory in its early years
when oligopolies were relatively free from market pressure (see Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation, supra note 1), but the market has significantly
changed since in a more competitive direction. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM
(2007). On the other hand, Baker acknowledged the force of Shiffrin’s criticism regarding
dissenting advertisers such as organic farmers and agreed that they should be afforded
protection. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J.
981, 995–97 (2009).
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unrelated to the authentically held views of the speaker, it can
reasonably be argued that the listener loses little by having the
15
16
cluttered marketplace cleared of such speech. Purely from a
thinker’s perspective, however, I would think at least
informational advertising should be protected. Informational
advertising may be dictated by the market, but the market itself
reflects preferences of people who may well want information
about travel, electronic devices, and drug prices. To be sure,
many of those preferences are created by advertising, but many
are not, and those that are so created are still the product of
thought.
I am also interested in Shiffrin’s views about image
advertising. On the one hand, as I read her, she places
importance on the presence of rational agents, but she does not
believe that “emotional” speech should be beneath First
Amendment protection. Some believe that many of our greatest
artists are employed by corporations and that advertisements are
well designed to provoke aesthetic reactions. I, however, would
be sympathetic to an argument that image advertising in our
culture is a special form of manipulation that should not be
protected. I think a thinker perspective could underwrite that
argument though it would need to distinguish imagistic political
advertising. In the end, despite having claimed many years ago
that commercial advertising should receive a degree of free
speech protection, I now regret it given the sweeping protection
provided for such advertising made by the Court (upholding
tobacco advertising for me was the last straw). A thinker
perspective and a liberty perspective (the two overlap) can
provide part of the justification for putting commercial and
corporate speech outside the protection of the First
Amendment, but the addition of other perspectives (e.g.,
democracy and dissent perspectives) can strengthen the case.
Third, Shiffrin thinks that her mentioned categories of
speech should be foundational and subject to strong and
principled protection. As she puts it, she has only offered a
sketch of her views (which was quite enough work), but I am left

15. Although Shiffrin focuses on the thinker (including speakers and listeners), she
need not accept the marketplace arguments put forth by Holmes.
16. This is particularly true when the speech promotes corruption of the democratic
process. On the other hand, constitutional considerations should not be considered
absent. For example, it would be deeply problematic if corporations were authorized to
sponsor Republicans, but not Democrats or vice versa. On this analysis, corporations
should get some form of political equality protection, but not liberty protection.
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wondering about the meaning of foundational and principled,
especially the latter. Leaving aside the focus on different kinds
of autonomy, I am wondering how much the commitment to
principle might put her in the Kant/Rawls/Dworkin/Baker camp.
Fourth, I think Shiffrin is entirely correct in arguing that a
thinker perspective lays bare a major problem with the
compelled speech regulation at issue in Barnette. She maintains
that it is simply illicit for the government to use manipulative
methods bypassing deliberative faculties in order to influence
17
the child. I agree with this, but I would add that I think
compelled speech should be unconstitutional even if it were not
calculated to influence the speaker. As Laurence Tribe
maintains, there is something deeply wrong with forcing
someone like the school child in Barnette or the driver in
18
19
Wooley to be a forced courier of, or megaphone for, a
20
government message. In my view, it is not just (as Baker might
have it) that formal autonomy is breached, compelled speech
simply does not appropriately respect the speaker’s human
dignity whether the speaker or audience is influenced or not.
Finally, I think Shiffrin is entirely right to observe that
associations are not just sites for amplifying voices, but that they
are also sites for forming values and thus particularly important
from the thinker’s perspective. Exposing the narrowness of prior
law on association is a substantial contribution of the thinker’s
perspective. I think it is worth observing, however, that these
instrumental perspectives on associations do not exhaust
associational values. I have in mind intimate associations,
particularly friendships. Friendship involves substantial concern
for the good of the friend and a readiness to act in ways that
21
further that good. As Lawrence Blum argues, “Friendship is an
altruistic phenomenon . . . ; a relationship based on mutual advantage (even if it involved mutual liking) would not in this
17. Image advertising also seeks to bypass deliberative faculties, but so does much
political advertising. The compelled speech in Barnette is distinguishable. Nonetheless,
even if I were inclined to protect commercial advertising and the speech of non-press
business corporations, I would cast the regulatory net broadly enough to permit
government to regulate imagistic commercial advertising, but not imagistic political
advertising. That, however, would require a long discussion.
18. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). It is possible, but less likely that New
Hampshire was trying to influence the mind of the driver by putting the motto on his car
than West Virginia was trying to influence the mind of the child.
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 901 n.15 (1978).
20. Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood,
28 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 641, 645 (2001).
21. LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY 43 (1980).
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sense be a friendship.” Blum maintains that without the
presence of altruism, trust, reliance, and substantial personal
23
involvement would not be possible. If Blum is right, an
important aspect of intimate association is captured neither by
the speech amplification perspective nor by the thinker’s
perspective. This would be a criticism only if these perspectives
purported to be comprehensive, but I do not understand them to
do so. I am not sure whether Blum’s understanding of friendship
has practical or theoretical value for freedom of speech, though I
would tend to believe that freedom of association is best
supported by support of all of its underlying values. I suspect
that one could develop fruitful insights about freedom of speech
by concentrating on the full range of values that underlie
associations. This dialogue itself has shown that insights abound
if one starts from democratic participation, speaker autonomy,
or the autonomy of the thinker. Because I believe free speech is
supported by a multiplicity of values, I do not believe we have
exhausted the theoretical richness of the free speech terrain, but
we have covered a lot of ground and opened some new territory
in the process.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 44.

